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Presidential War Powers and Humanitarian 
Intervention 
 





Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war” 
mean that the president needs congressional approval before 
using military force?1  As this Article discusses, there are a range 
of answers to this question.  The Article examines this debate in 
the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions 
taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop large-
scale, serious violations of human rights.  If the president wishes 
to use the military for these purposes, should he have more 
authority under the Constitution to do so?  Less?  The same?  
What this Article suggests is that the concerns which drove the 
Founders to place limits on the President’s war powers, especially 
the fear that a glory-seeking chief executive would precipitously 
use the military in order to serve his own desire for fame, are not 
as serious when it comes to humanitarian intervention.  
Presidents are unlikely to significantly enhance their short-term 
popularity or historical legacies by using the military in this way.  
As a result, there is less reason to fear that they will be incautious 
in these situations.  In addition, it is possible to establish 
standards by which to judge presidential action in this arena, 
placing another effective limit on the President.  In light of the 
reduced risks, as well as the terrible costs of inaction in the face 
of grave human rights crises, we should accept some flexibility 
for the President to decide to intercede for humanitarian reasons. 
 
 
* LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. University of Michigan.  The 
author is an attorney with the federal government.  The views expressed here 
are solely his own. 
1.  U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 11. 
1
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Introduction 
 
Constitutional debates about the degree of power the 
president should have to engage the United States in military 
action are hardly new.  Commentators have proposed an array 
of answers to this question, ranging from very restrictive views 
of the President’s war-making power to especially broad visions 
of this authority.  Naturally, there are also those who have taken 
more moderate positions than either of these two extremes.  This 
Article considers the question of presidential war powers in the 
context of humanitarian intervention.  It will explore the degree 
of license the president should possess to commence military 
action if it is for humanitarian purposes.  Should the President’s 
war making authority, whatever it may be, be greater in these 
settings? Should it be lessened? Should it be no different than in 
other contexts? 
This Article suggests there should not be as much concern 
over abuse of power by a Commander in Chief in calling out the 
armed forces for humanitarian purposes and, therefore, 
presidents should have at least some flexibility to initiate 
military action for legitimate humanitarian causes.  The 
troubling incentives that exist for presidents to use the military 
for selfish, self-promoting reasons in other contexts do not exist 
to the same degree in the case of humanitarian intervention.  On 
a related note, public opinion is likely to act as a brake on 
presidential action in these situations.  Finally, humanitarian 
interventions are generally smaller scale operations involving 
less risk to (at least) American life, meaning that the cost of 
abuse of power by the president will be lower.  This is not to say 
that presidents should engage in such actions at the drop of a 
hat; there needs to be due consideration as to what criteria 
should be used to judge a proposed intervention.  Such standards 
should also guard against presidential abuse of military 
authority in this arena, again reducing the risk that presidents 
will misuse their power. 
As a starting point, this Article will first discuss some of the 
main lines of thought about the president’s war-making powers 
under the Constitution.  It will then examine the idea behind 
humanitarian intervention and the related concept of 
Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”).  While the definition of 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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humanitarian intervention is further discussed below,2 for now 
this Article will broadly define it as foreign intervention or 
military action whose primary goal is not necessarily a victory 
over an enemy state’s armed forces (or a non-state actor’s armed 
forces), but is instead directed to relieve or end a serious 
violation of human rights involving civilians or others who are 
hors de combat (literally “outside the fight”; for these purposes, 
essentially not engaged in military encounters).  Understanding 
the rationales grounding the theories of the president’s war-
making authority will help determine whether his power should 
be enhanced, diminished, or unchanged when considering use of 
military force for humanitarian reasons. 
 
Theories of the President’s War Making Powers Under the 
Constitution: The Restrictive, Pro-Congress View 
 
The restrictive view maintains that the president’s 
authority to commit United States forces to armed conflict in the 
absence of congressional assent—either through a declaration of 
war or some sort of statutory authorization—is quite limited.  In 
this telling, the president needs congressional approval for just 
about anything more than defensive action to repel an attack.  
This viewpoint draws its support primarily from the 
constitutional text and its delegation to Congress of the power to 
“declare war”3 and appropriate funds for the armed forces.4  
However, its proponents can also cite to a significant number of 
statements made by the Founders indicating it was precisely 
their intent to limit the ability of any one person to bring the 
United States to a state of war. 
John Hart Ely was one of the restrictive view’s champions.  
To Ely, the question of whether Congress or the president had 
the primary authority to commence hostilities was not a close 





2.  See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
3.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
4.  See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
3
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[F]rom the standpoint of twentieth-century 
observers, the ‘original understanding’ of the 
document’s framers and ratifiers can be obscure to 
the point of inscrutability. Often this is true. In 
this case, however, it isn’t. The power to declare 
war was constitutionally vested in Congress. The 
debates, and early practice, establish that this 
meant that all wars, big or small, ‘declared’ in so 
many words or not—most weren’t, even then—
had to be legislatively authorized.5 
 
Ely explained that Congress was specifically given this 
power to make it difficult for the country to go to war.  In other 
words, as George Mason put it, the Founders wanted to “‘clog’ 
the road to combat.”6  They feared that the executive would be 
more anxious to fight wars than the legislature, so the less 
combative branch was inserted into the process.7 This decision 
rested on the theory that it would be harder to get a larger 
number of people on board with a given action than if the 
decision were to be left to a single individual.8  The House was 
included in this process, unlike the approval process for treaties 
and many presidential appointments in which the legislative 
role is limited to the Senate.9  Its inclusion was probably due to 
its closer relationship to the population as a whole, i.e. those who 
would be fighting and paying the most direct costs of any 
decision to go to war.10  At Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention, 
James Wilson, who had participated in the writing of the 
Constitution, defended the document in part by asserting that 
power was divided in such a way that “[i]t will not be in the 
power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in 
[war]; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the 
 
5.  JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993) (internal citations omitted). 
6.  Id. at 4; see also M. Andrew Campanelli et al., The Original 
Understanding of the Declare War Clause, 24 J.L. & POL. 49, 54 (2008) 
(discussing Mason’s views). 
7.  See ELY, supra note 5, at 4. 
8.  See id. 
9.  See id. 
10.  See id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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legislature at large.”11  Jon Michaels writes: 
 
[T]he United States would also be a great 
democracy: its decisions would reflect the will of 
the citizenry. Hence, Congress as the most direct 
representatives of the People, would necessarily 
be involved in military policy, simultaneously 
promoting the virtues of limited government by 
checking the perceived natural inclinations of the 
strong Executive and upholding the ideals of 
democracy by remaining the true servants of the 
People. Moreover, decisions by the president to 
wage war could not be undertaken without first 
benefiting from the deliberative insights of a 
legislative assembly and without concomitantly 
securing the tacit blessings and consent of the 
citizenry.12 
 
More recently, when President Obama was considering how 
to respond to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, commentators 
who argued that any action would require congressional 
involvement referenced Mason’s language.  Doug Bandow has 
suggested that the president would need to consult Congress, 
and this was the very design intended by the Founders, 
including Mason, to “clog” up the road to war.13  Similarly, David 
Cole opined in the New York Review of Books in defense of the 
President’s consultation with Congress, staking the claim that 
“[g]oing to Congress did clog war,” but this very clogging would 
lead to a better long-term resolution to the problem of Syria’s 
use of chemical weapons.14 
 
11.  See Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1637, 1648–49 (2000) (internal citation omitted). 
12.  Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, 
Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1001, 1051–52 (2004). 
13.  See Doug Bandow, Bomb Syria? President Obama Must Go to 
Congress for a Declaration of War, CATO INST. (Aug. 30, 2013), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/bomb-syria-president-obama-
must-go-congress-declaration-of-war. 
14.  See David Cole, Clogging the War Machine, N.Y. REV. DAILY (Sept. 19, 
2013, 9:10 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/09/19/syria-clogging-
5
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Louis Fisher is another well-known advocate of the 
restrictive view.  Fisher makes the point that the Founders were 
concerned with creating an executive with limited powers in 
comparison to the British monarch whose rule they had only 
recently thrown off.  He notes that, in The Federalist, Alexander 
Hamilton—one of the staunchest supporters of strong executive 
power of his generation—stated that the American president 
would be “less threatening” to the people than an English king, 
precisely because the former lacked the power to declare war or 
raise an army.15  Fisher also mentions that when President 
Washington used the militia to protect Americans living on the 
frontier from hostile Indian attacks, he understood his authority 
to be strictly limited to defensive measures.  Any offensive plans 
against tribal forces would first have to be authorized by 
Congress.16  As James Baker points out, this defense versus 
offense distinction also represented former President (and 
future Chief Justice) Taft’s view more than a century later.17 
In expounding on why the Founders thought it so important 
to create an executive whose war making powers would be more 
circumscribed than the British monarch’s, both Fisher and 
William Treanor18 assert that the Founders saw the possibility 
of an executive becoming motivated (far more so than Congress) 
to engage in war out of a desire for fame.  Fisher points to 
Federalist No. 4, in which John Jay wrote that “absolute 
monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such 
as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, 
 
war-machine/ (emphasis in original). 
15.  See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1645; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 
398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
16.  See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1653; see also Robert Bejesky, War 
Powers Pursuant to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the “Zone 
of Twilight,” 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 26–27 (2012) (discussing Washington’s 
views). 
17.  See JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY 
LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 179–80 (2007) (internal citation omitted); see also 
Bejesky, supra note 16, at 32 (discussing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581, 591 (1889), in which the Court took note of the previous Secretary of 
State, William Marcy’s expressed viewpoint that the president lacked 
authority to initiate offensive hostilities with another country). 
18.  See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to 
Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their 
particular families or partisans.”19  Unlike the executive, 
Treanor argues, “individual members of Congress would not win 
fame if the nation went to war and won.”20 
Both authors cite to Madison’s Helvidius letters, written 
during the neutrality crisis of 1793.  The United States was 
trying to avoid being drawn into the ongoing conflict between 
France and Great Britain.21  The question arose whether 
President Washington could issue a proclamation of neutrality.22  
Secretary of State Jefferson argued that this was beyond the 
President’s power, because he could no more pronounce that 
there would not be a war (i.e. that the U.S. would remain 
neutral) than he could declare that there would be one.23  The 
Helvidius letters were published in support of Jefferson’s 
position and in response to Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s 
Pacificus letters claiming that the President could issue such an 
edict.24 
In the fourth Helvidius letter, Madison contended that: 
 
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be 
found than in the clause which confides the 
question of war or peace to the legislature, and not 
to the executive department. . . . [T]he trust and 
the temptation would be too great for any one 
man: not such as nature may offer as the prodigy 
of many centuries, but such as may be expected in 
the ordinary successions of magistracy. War is in 
fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.25 
 
 
19.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 97–98 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987); see also Fisher, supra note 11, at 1651. 
20.  Treanor, supra note 18, at 700. 
21.  See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 14–20 (5th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Bus. 2014). 
22.  See id. at 14. 
23.  See id. at 14–15. 
24.  See id. at 15–16. 
25.  Treanor, supra note 18, at 747 (quoting James Madison, “Helvidius” 
Number 4, in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 108–09 (Robert Rutland et al. 
eds., Virginia Univ. Press 1985)). 
7
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Madison also noted that war is a temptation for the 
executive in particular because: 
 
It is in war . . . that laurels are to be gathered, and 
it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The 
strongest passions, and most dangerous 
weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, 
avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of 
fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and 
duty of peace.26 
 
In summing up his own argument, Treanor writes that: 
 
Combined, these statements about fame and war 
strongly suggest why the Framers gave Congress 
the power to declare war. First, these statements 
are evidence of a widely-held belief among 
Federalists and Antifederalists that kings—the 
“executive” that they knew—had frequently led 
their nations into war solely to achieve glory. 
Second, they reveal a widespread conviction that 
the passions that influenced leaders of a 
monarchy would also hold sway over leaders of a 
republic. Third, the statements reflect an 
understanding that the President, the head of the 
new executive branch, was the governmental 
official most likely to pursue fame. These 
statements lead to the logical, if unexpressed, 
conclusion that the President could not be trusted 
with the power to declare war because, in order to 
achieve glory, he would lead the nation into war 
when it was not in the national interest.27 
 
Thus, because the executive may have the most to gain 
personally from a decision to go to war, he should not be the one 
entrusted to make that determination.  As Robert Delahunty 
 
26.  Madison, supra note 25, at 108; see also Fisher, supra note 11, at 
1651–52; Treanor, supra note 18, at 747. 
27.  Treanor, supra note 18, at 745. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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notes, the rise of Napoleon likely confirmed for the Founders 
that their fears of a glory-seeking executive had been well-
founded.28 
Treanor points to solid empirical evidence to support the 
Founders’ fears.  He writes that “[a] concern with how they 
would be remembered has driven many Presidents.”29  As it 
turns out, a number of studies have found a correlation between 
time spent at war during a particular presidential 
administration and positive views of that administration.30  In 
particular, Treanor references one study which considered 
previous scholarship on this topic and found that, other than 
years in office, years spent at war had the strongest positive 
correlation with ranking of presidential satisfaction.31  Thus, 
there is good reason to fear that a president will succumb to the 
temptation to lead the country into battle as a means of 
enhancing his own historical legacy.32  As a result, the decision 
to go to war should be taken out of the president’s hands, or at 
least should not be in his hands alone. 
Marty Lederman, though not in the restrictive camp, makes 
the case that international law also places limits on the 
president’s authority to initiate hostilities on his own.  In April 
2017, when President Trump ordered the bombing of a Syrian 
airfield, Lederman argued that this sort of unprovoked strike on 
Syrian territory by the U.S. violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.33  The relevant portion of this provision says that 
 
28.  See Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The 
Army, Navy and Militia Clauses, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2003) 
(stating “[w]ithin the lifetimes of many of the Founders, a figure rose up in 
Europe—Napoleon Bonaparte—in whom these dangers were personified to 
perfection”). 
29.  Treanor, supra note 18, at 761. 
30.  See id. at 768 (internal citations omitted). 
31.  See id. (citing Dean Keith Simonton, Presidential Greatness: The 
Historical Consensus and Its Psychological Significance, 7 POL. PSYCHOL. 259, 
270–71 (1986)). 
32.  See Treanor, supra note 18, at 766 (quoting former Joint Chiefs 
Chairman William J. Crowe saying that “to be a great president you have to 
have a war” (internal citation omitted)).  On the other end, there is a fear that 
Presidents will refuse to seek peace for similar reasons: President Johnson 
rejected attempts to end American involvement in Vietnam because he would 
“not be the first President to lose a war.” Id. at 764 (internal citation omitted). 
33.  See Marty Lederman, Why the Strikes Against Syria Probably Violate 
the U.N. Charter and (Therefore) the U.S. Constitution, JUST SEC. (Apr. 6, 
9
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member states shall “refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”34  Because the U.N. Charter 
is a treaty ratified by the United States, it has the force of 
binding (and supreme) domestic law, as per Article VI of the 
Constitution.35  Lederman further points out that, to the extent 
the U.S. can violate the terms of a previously ratified treaty, it 
is only by means of congressional authorization.36  Thus, once 
again, if a president wishes to attack another U.N. state, he 
needs congressional approval first.37 
The high-water mark for the advocates of the Restrictive 
view appeared to be the 1973 passage of the War Powers 
Resolution (“WPR”).38  This statute, passed into law over the veto 
of President Nixon, ostensibly places important limits on the 
president’s ability to commit American troops for long periods of 
time without congressional approval.  It first states that the 
president in every possible instance “shall consult with Congress 
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”39 Once the military is 
called into action, the president “shall consult regularly with the 
Congress” for as long as American forces are fighting.40  
Additionally, once the president sends soldiers into battle, he is 
required to make a report to Congress within forty-eight hours.  
This report must include a statement why American forces have 
been employed, what the president’s authority for using them 
was, and how long military action is expected to last.41  Perhaps 
 
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39674/syrian-strikes-violate-u-n-charter-
constitution/ [hereinafter Why the Strikes]. 
34.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; see also Why the Strikes, supra note 33. 
35.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
36.  See Why the Strikes, supra note 33. 
37.  See Marty Lederman, No, the President Cannot Strike North Korea 
Without Congressional Approval, JUST SEC. (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/44056/no-president-strike-north-korea-
congressional-approval/ (explaining that, in August, 2017, Lederman used this 
same logic to argue that the President could not make a first strike against 
North Korea without congressional approval). 
38.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2018).  
39.  Id. § 1542. 
40.  Id. 
41.  See id. § 1543. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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most importantly, according to the terms of the WPR, the 
president is supposed to terminate the use of armed forces 
within sixty days, unless he has received authorization from 
Congress for continued use, Congress has granted a (one-time) 
thirty-day extension of the deadline, or Congress is unable to 
meet.42 
If followed scrupulously, the WPR would indeed place 
serious limits on a president’s ability to commit armed forces for 
any lengthy period.  In other words, the WPR was passed 
specifically to prevent a repeat of American involvement in 
Vietnam, at least without congressional agreement.43 
However, it is not clear that the WPR has had a significant 
impact on a president wishing to send out the troops.  As James 
Baker writes, “the [sixty-day] clock has generated considerable 
debate, but has not in fact triggered the withdrawal of U.S. 
armed forces.”44  Harold Koh adds that “[w]e should accept the 
bitter truth that the War Powers Resolution has become 
increasingly obsolete.”45  Naval Officer John Rolph offers an even 
gloomier assessment, writing that “[d]espite the minor war 
powers concessions that Congress has wrested from the 
President since the Resolution’s enactment, the legislation has 
proven to be an abysmal failure overall.”46 
The WPR’s lack of effectiveness can be chalked up to a 
number of factors.  For one, many administrations have 
questioned its constitutionality and/or supported its repeal.47  
 
42.   See id. § 1544. 
43.  See Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 991 (2016) (stating “it seemed clear that 
the focus of the War Powers Resolution was as a ‘No More Vietnams’ statute”); 
see also BAKER, supra note 17, at 183 (“[A]t the close of the Vietnam conflict, 
the Congress sought to exercise its ‘war power’ prospectively through creation 
of a statutory framework. The War Powers Resolution was ‘necessary and 
proper,’ proponents argued, in light of the American experience in Vietnam 
and Cambodia.”); Transcript of Testimony by Legal Adviser Harold Hongju 
Koh at 12, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2011) (making a 
similar point about the Vietnam War) [hereinafter Koh Statement]. 
44.  BAKER, supra note 17, at 188. 
45.  Koh, supra note 43, at 1020. 
46.  John W. Rolph, The Decline and Fall of the War Powers Resolution: 
Waging War Under the Constitution After Desert Storm, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 85, 
85–86 (1992). 
47.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 17, at 187–88; Rolph, supra note 46, at 
89. 
11
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However, even if the WPR is constitutional, it does not appear 
to include a real enforcement mechanism.  As Baker points out, 
for a claim to be brought that a President violated the WPR, a 
member of Congress would have to obtain standing to sue, and 
this “is unlikely to happen, as a matter of substance or 
process.”48  Even if this barrier were surmounted, it remains 
uncertain whether a court would be willing to address the 
underlying merits of such a claim.49 
Another factor disfavoring the WPR is the changing nature 
of warfare in the forty-five years since its passage.  War is 
becoming less likely to be carried out by large armies on 
battlefields50 and more likely to be fought through new 
technologies, such as drones, or cyber attack.  The rules set out 
by the WPR do not seem well-suited for these forms of modern 
warfare.  What will count as “hostilities,” in situations where 
“war” is fought by remote control or by computers, and not by 
soldiers or sailors?  As Professor Eric Jensen explains, “[m]any 
of these advancing technologies will be so qualitatively different 
from current means and methods of warfare that they will 
undercut the fundamental understanding of the WPR and 
Congress’s intent to regulate the use of military force by the 
President.”51  He also observes that President Obama argued 
that the WPR was not triggered by his actions in Libya precisely 
because they did not involve “boots on the ground.”52  Jensen’s 
proposed solution is that the WPR be amended to make clear 
that “boots on the ground” and “hostilities” are not required to 
trigger the WPR’s provisions.53 
Additionally, many uses of these advanced technologies may 
well start and be completed too quickly for the timetable the 
 
48.  BAKER, supra note 17, at 191. 
49.  See id. at 192. 
50.  See Eric Talbot Jensen, Future War and the War Powers Resolution, 
29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 503 (2015) (describing the WPR as having been 
“written in an era where the means and methods of armed conflict were 
centered on humans interacting on a geographically limited battlefield” and 
noting that while this may continue to be the case for many countries, 
“technologically advanced nations such as the United States are developing 
and will continue to develop new weapons that will not require human 
interaction in combat to be effective”). 
51.  See id. at 504. 
52.  See id. at 529–30 (internal citations omitted). 
53.  See id. at 552–55. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
ARTICLE 2_SHERMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:29 PM 
2019 PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 609 
WPR establishes.54  Because of this, even if one were to accept 
the sixty-day clock, it is not clear how much of a limitation it 
really imposes.  If there are going to be significant limits on the 
president’s war-making powers, they are likely to be the same 
ones that have always existed: popular opinion, namely how 
willing the public is to support a president’s decision to go to war 
or even engage in more limited actions, and Congress’ 
appropriations and investigative powers. 
 
The Expansive, Pro-Executive View 
 
In stark contrast to the proponents of the restrictive view 
are those who see the president’s authority to enter the United 
States into military conflict as relatively unbounded.  These 
scholars argue that the declare war clause, rather than serving 
as a grant of permission from Congress to the president to 
engage in hostilities, was instead merely intended to give 
Congress the power to declare that a state of war did, in fact, 
exist—perhaps in response to actions already taken by the 
president or by a hostile power.  John Yoo, one of the leading 
advocates of this viewpoint, writes that “[a]ccording to the 
international law authorities of the time [of the founding], a 
declaration of war played the technical function of providing 
notice to the enemy nation that hostilities were to begin, due to 
some injury suffered.”55  Eugene Rostow further explains that: 
 
With regard to the actual employment of the 
armed forces, it is apparent that the term “declare 
war” in the Constitution referred to the 
classifications of the law of nations, which makes 
a sharp distinction between the law of war and the 
 
54.  See, e.g., Stephen Dycus, Cybersecurity Symposium: National 
Leadership, Individual Responsibility: Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155, 162 (2010) (“The War Powers Resolution, for 
example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm’s way, rather than 
with clicking a computer mouse to launch a cyber attack, although the strategic 
consequences might be similar. And the WPR’s relatively relaxed timetable for 
executive notice and legislative response is unrealistic for war on a digital 
battlefield”). 
55.  John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers 
Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (1999). 
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law of peace. The law of nations was an intimate 
familiar to the men of the revolutionary 
generation in America. So far as international law 
is concerned, nations were then, and are now, free 
to use force in time of peace by way of self-help 
against acts or policies of other nations which they 
deem contrary to international law, and which 
have remained unredressed after a demand for 
amends.56 
 
In a review of Ely’s book, Philip Bobbitt maintains that “a 
declaration of war only comes after war has commenced”57 and 
that, therefore, “such declarations cannot be conditions 
precedent to the making of war.”58  To the extent that Congress 
could assert its own authority in the realm of war making, it 
would be through use of its appropriations powers.59  As Rostow 
noted in 1986, American forces up to that point had been used 
in international conflicts over 200 times, but the United States 
had only declared war five times.60  Similarly, in a speech 
criticizing the WPR (a natural focus for modern commentary on 
this debate), Robert Bork also pointed to the long history of 
presidential use of force, even in the absence of a declaration of 
war, and asserted that “[t]he need for Presidents to have that 
power, particularly in the modern age, should be obvious to 
almost anyone.”61 
As for Yoo, he contends that rather than relying on the 
views of the participants at the Philadelphia convention who 
 
56.  Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 
50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 850–51 (1972). 
57.  Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and 
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 1364, 1376 (1994). 
58.  Id. 
59.  See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1179; see also Robert H. Bork, Erosion of 
the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH U. L. Q. 693, 700 (1990). Of 
course, at the time of the founding, the United States did not have a standing 
army, which likely gave Congress’ appropriations power even more bite than 
it has now. 
60.  See Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More Unto the Breach:” The War Powers 
Resolution Revisited, 21 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986); see also Yoo, supra 
note 55, at 1170. 
61.  Bork, supra note 59, at 698. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/2
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wrote the Constitution, we should look to the views of those who 
ratified it—i.e. the delegates to the state ratifying conventions—
as more authoritative voices on how the language of the declare 
war clause was understood: “[t]he action of ratification by 
popularly elected conventions selected specifically for the 
purpose gave the Constitution its political legitimacy.  
Therefore, what those who ratified the Constitution believed the 
meaning of the text to be is determinative for originalist 
purposes, rather than the intentions of those who drafted the 
document.”62  This takes some of the steam out of the other side’s 
reliance on statements from the likes of Madison, Hamilton, 
Wilson, and Mason.  Madison himself appeared to take this 
position, declaring in Congress that “[i]f we were to look, 
therefore, for the meaning of the [Constitution] beyond the face 
of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General 
Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, 
which accepted and ratified the Constitution.”63 
The states were a bit haphazard when it came to preserving 
records of their ratifying conventions, so access to the 
deliberations varies.  Gregory Maggs explains that “some states 
engaged in lengthy debates and kept excellent records, while 
other states considered the question of ratification only briefly 
and kept almost no records.”64  Only four states—Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York—had extensive 
records of their debates, while five others—Delaware, New 
Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—have none 
at all.65  Yoo examines some of the debates from the Virginia 
convention and alleges that they give us a representative sample 
of the overall scene.  This is because of Virginia’s geographical 
 
62.  Yoo, supra note 55, at 1173; see also Bobbitt, supra note 57, at 1375 
(likewise arguing for looking to the views of those who ratified the 
Constitution, rather than those who wrote it, for understanding its meaning). 
Of course, many of the Constitution’s writers in Philadelphia also participated 
in their states’ ratifying conventions.  See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide 
to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original 
Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 481–84 (2009) 
(discussing statements made by Founders at state ratifying conventions as 
bases of Constitution’s meaning). 
63.  4 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796); see also Maggs, supra note 62, at 458–
59. 
64.  Maggs, supra note 62, at 460. 
65.  See id. at 481. 
15
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and political importance,66 and because the debate in its 
convention was widespread and contentious.67  Yoo concludes 
that the views expressed in Virginia’s ratifying convention 
“approximated the views of the median Framer.”68  The four 
“extensive” states were also four of the five largest states, so it 
is not entirely clear that the views of delegates from these states 
can speak for those from the other nine.69  Similarly, it may not 
be safe to assume that states where the vote was close, such as 
New York (three vote margin), Virginia (ten), and Rhode Island 
(two), viewed things the same as the three states where the vote 
was unanimous: Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia.  Of course, 
there may well have been significant differences between the 
small states and the large, as well as regional variances.  Maggs 
also points out that, even where we have extensive records, these 
accounts may not be entirely accurate because of limited 
technology and bias on the part of the reporters themselves.70  
Indeed, a page after his statement extolling the state ratifying 
conventions as a source of constitutional meaning, Madison 
hastened to add that such records likely contained errors and 
misconceptions.71 
 
66.  See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1203. 
67.  See id. 
68.  Id.  Chris DeRose asserts that what really made the difference in 
Virginia’s ratification of the Constitution was not some acceptance of a 
particular viewpoint or reading of the document.  Rather, many delegates 
realized that whatever reservations they might have, given how many states 
had already ratified prior to the opening of Virginia’s convention (eight, or one 
short of the number required for ratification), the fledgling country’s then 
largest state risked being left out in the cold if it rejected the document.  See 
CHRIS DEROSE, FOUNDING RIVALS, MADISON VS. MONROE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
AND THE ELECTION THAT SAVED A NATION 171–72 (2011).  Though, as it turns 
out, New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify, beating Virginia by two 
days; this fact was not yet known by the Virginia delegates at the time they 
voted to ratify.  See id. at 198–99.  Maggs also cautions against relying too 
heavily on the records of the state ratification debates, writing that “anyone 
citing the records of the state ratifying conventions should recognize that these 
records often do not provide perfect proof of the original meaning of the 
Constitution. On the contrary, various significant grounds may exist for 
impeaching claims about the original meaning based on these records.” Maggs, 
supra note 62, at 486. 
69.  See Maggs, supra note 62, at 491. 
70.  See id. at 488–89. 
71.  4 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 (1796) (remarks of James Madison); see also 
Maggs, supra note 62, at 488. 
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As for the debates Maggs considered, Yoo concedes that 
there was great concern among Antifederalists about 
presidential power in the newly proposed system. But 
Federalists (including Madison himself) responded to those 
concerns not by arguing that the President lacked the power to 
initiate armed conflict without congressional assent, but rather 
by claiming that Congress would control presidential war 
making ambitions through the power of the purse.72  If the views 
of Ely, Fisher, and others were correct, Federalists would surely 
have eased Antifederalist fears by claiming that the president 
could not take the country to war unilaterally.73  Furthermore, 
Yoo observes that Article II of the Constitution could have been 
written as “the [president] shall have no power to commence 
war, or conclude peace, . . . without legislative approval.”74 
Yoo also argues that his position is supported by the history 
of state constitution writing in the period leading up to the 
Constitutional Convention.  Prior to the revolution, the 
American colonies were governed by royal charters.  These 
charters gave strong authority to the colonial governor, 
including powers over the “raising and deployment of the 
military.”75  To the extent that colonial legislatures tried to 
restrict such powers, it was through appropriations.76  When the 
colonies became states and wrote new constitutions, there was a 
reaction against this strong executive power.  The limitations on 
executive power in the new states took a multitude of forms; in 
many states, the decision was made to do away with a single, 
unitary executive.77 
Far from supporting a restrictive view of executive war 
making authority, Yoo makes the case that the states discovered 
these severe restrictions on executive power to be unworkable.  
 
72.  See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1207.  In a subsequent article co-authored 
with Jide Nzelibe, Yoo and Nzelibe assert that Congress has used this power 
effectively on occasion.  See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and 
Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2521 (2006). 
73.  See Yoo, supra note 55, at 1207. 
74.  Id. at 1200–01 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75.  John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 219 (1996). 
76.  See id. at 220–21. 
77.  See id. at 222–23 (noting that Pennsylvania, for example, replaced its 
governor with a twelve-person executive council). 
17
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Thus, by the time of the Constitutional Convention (and its 
aftermath), the pendulum had swung back in the direction of 
greater executive power.  Yoo notes that a draft of the Virginia 
Constitution authored by Jefferson which greatly restricted 
executive authority (including war making powers) was rejected, 
not only in Virginia, but also in the approaches taken by other 
states.78  Instead, the new state constitutions favored an 
approach closer to (if not exactly the same as) that used by 
England, which did not place such severe restrictions on 
executive authority to commence hostilities.79  Though, as Yoo 
mentions, some states did place limits on a governor’s power to 
call out the militia,80 he claims that this actually supports his 
argument about the federal Constitution because it indicates 
that constitution writers thought it necessary to explicitly 
indicate where the executive’s war making powers were limited, 
yet no such similar limitation appears in the federal 
Constitution81—assuming, that is, one first accepts his reading 
of what the declare war clause actually means. 
Rostow takes a similar line, asserting that the declare war 
clause “does not mean that the national force can only be used if 
Congress has first approved the President’s action through a 
declaration of war.”82  He further charges that those who 
advocate the restrictive view have a naïve picture of how 
international affairs truly operate, writing that they “suppose 
that if the United States were weak, pacifist, and unarmed, the 
predators of the jungle would fully respect its rights under 
international law.”83  Sounding a somewhat related theme, 
Bobbitt argues that the claims of the restrictive views’ advocates 
 
78.  See id. at 224–25 (stating that “[a]lthough a dead end, Jefferson’s 
scheme was widely circulated, and it provided an example of how the Framers 
could have created a legislature-first approach to war—if they had chosen to 
do so”). 
79.  See id. at 225–26. 
80.  See id. at 227 (referring to Delaware’s constitution as an example). 
81.  See Yoo, supra note 75 at 227 (stating “if the Framers of the federal 
Constitution had wanted the President to consult with either the legislature 
or within the executive before embarking on a military venture, they easily 
could have borrowed from these state provisions and required the President to 
consult with the Senate (as some in the Constitutional Convention proposed) 
or some other body”). 
82.  Rostow, supra note 60, at 16. 
83.  Id. at 18. 
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prove too much: they proclaim that the change in language in 
early drafts of the Constitution from giving Congress the power 
to “make” war to “declare” war meant that Congress would not 
be responsible for the conduct of military action, but its 
permission would be required in order to take the country into 
armed conflict.84  If so, Bobbitt argues, then there is no room left 
for a stance that the President can, for example, respond to a 
sudden attack, even in the absence of congressional 
authorization—a position no one is willing to take.85  In addition 
to agreeing with Yoo’s claims about the true meaning of 
“declaring war” under international law,86 Rostow turns the 
democratic accountability argument made by proponents of the 
restrictive view on its head.  Members of Congress, he argues, 
would actually prefer that the responsibility for putting 
American lives at risk lie exclusively with the President.87 
Aside from these claims about textual meaning and original 
intent, but related to Rostow’s point about how international 
affairs are actually conducted is an argument that the President, 
because of informational advantages that he has due to the vast 
resources at his disposal, and because he is a single actor, is 
simply in a better position than Congress to make decisions 
about war making.  This is especially so when those conclusions 
need to be reached with dispatch.  Professor David Moore writes 
that “[a]s has been recognized since the Founding, the President, 
in comparison to Congress, is better able to act quickly, 
uniformly, with secrecy, and based on information gathered from 
far-flung diplomatic and military agents.”88  Or, as Robert 
 
84.  See Bobbitt, supra note 57, at 1376. 
85.  See id. 
86.  See Rostow, supra note 60, at 16. 
87.  Id.; see also ELY, supra note 5, at 49 (quoting former Senator Thomas 
Eagleton testifying in a Senate hearing that he had concluded “Congress didn’t 
really want to have its fingerprints on sensitive matters pertaining to putting 
our Armed Forces into hostilities . . . . [Instead,] Congress preferred the right 
of retrospective criticism” (internal citation omitted)); Jensen, supra note 50, 
at 502 (describing struggle over war powers as one “characterized by what 
seems to be an ever-increasing adventurism by the President and an ever-
decreasing willingness to exert power by the Congress”); Rolph, supra note 46, 
at 90 (stating “Congress has been reluctant to assert itself on war powers 
issues”). 
88.  David H. Moore, Taking Cues from Congress: Judicial Review, 
Congressional Authorization, and the Expansion of Presidential Power, 90 
19
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Bejesky puts it, “[i]n military affairs, members of Congress 
cannot expeditiously garner the level of information about a 
potential or existing hostility that the Executive can attain.”89 
The Supreme Court has accepted the logic of this argument 
as well.  In a 1965 decision challenging the Secretary of State’s 
refusal to validate passports for travel to Cuba, the Court wrote: 
 
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature 
of contemporary international relations, and the 
fact that the Executive is immediately privy to 
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, 
evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, 
Congress—in giving the Executive authority over 
matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint 
with a brush broader than that it customarily 
wields in domestic areas.90 
 
While many of the arguments discussed so far call upon 
original intent to bolster their claims, the informational 
argument has a decidedly non-originalist bent to it.  Many have 
suggested that part of the reason for the president’s advantages 
here is the increasing complexity of world affairs and the 
centrality of the United States in those undertakings, things 





NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1033–34 (2015). 
89.  Bejesky, supra note 16, at 51. 
90.  Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). 
91.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss 
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444-45 (2012) (stating 
“[t]he complexities of the modern economy and administrative state, along with 
the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated 
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch”); Oona A. Hathaway, 
Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE 
L.J. 140, 267 (2009) (noting “[t]he United States, which was at the time of its 
creation a small and relatively insignificant entity in world politics, was by the 
1940s a dominant economic, military, and political force”).  Hathaway also 
points out that the dramatic increase in foreign aid by the United States in the 
aftermath of World War II increased presidential authority in the realm of 
international affairs relative to that of Congress.  See id. at 185. 
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The Middle Ground 
 
In between the pro-executive and pro-Congress viewpoints 
exists something of a compromise approach.  These analyses, 
coming largely from Obama and Clinton administration officials, 
have taken the position that, for limited military operations, a 
president can move forward on his own.  In other words, the 
president’s authority to act on military matters is not without 
restrictions, but Congress’ input is only required for actions that 
reach a certain threshold of military involvement. 
In justifying President Obama’s decision to intervene in 
2011 in Libya without seeking prior congressional authorization, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Caroline Krass, 
writing on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), first 
explained the limited nature of the planned Libya operation: 
America would be acting in concert with allies and ground forces 
would not be used at all or, at most, as part of search and rescue 
operations, and, therefore, the risk of substantial casualties was 
low.92  As a result, the President had not been required to seek 
congressional authorization.93  The Krass memo also referenced 
prior OLC memos which had concluded that the President could 
take military action to “protect[] important national interests” 
without prior input from Congress.94 
Picking up on this theme, then-State Department Legal 
Adviser Harold Koh argued that American engagement in Libya 
did not rise to the level of “hostilities,”95 and, therefore, even if 
one accepted the authority of the WPR, it was not implicated by 
our actions in Libya.96  Though, as Koh also pointed out, in spite 
of the claim that the WPR was not triggered by the 
 
92.  See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, U.S. Principal Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., Authority to Use 
Military Force in Libya 6 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf. 
93.  See id. 
94.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
95.  See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4; 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2012) 
(stating the WPR is triggered by “the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use 
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations”). 
96.  See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4. 
21
ARTICLE 2_SHERMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:29 PM 
618 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
Administration’s activities in Libya, President Obama in fact 
followed the WPR’s requirement to notify Congress within forty-
eight hours of the beginning of the intervention.97  Nevertheless, 
Koh asserted that “hostilities” was an “ambiguous standard”98 
and noted that, not only was it not defined in the WPR itself, but 
it had also never been fleshed out by any reviewing court or in 
subsequent legislation.99 
Koh further argued that the vagueness was intentional to 
allow some flexibility for presidential action.100  As a result, what 
“constitutes ‘hostilities’ . . . has been determined more by 
interbranch practice than by a narrow parsing of dictionary 
definitions.”101  However, quoting former Executive Branch 
officials, it has been seen as existing when American forces are 
actively exchanging fire with the armed forces of other 
countries.102  By contrast, “hostilities” should not be said to exist 
when the threat to U.S. forces is low.103  According to these 
standards, American military activities in Libya did not cross 
the “hostilities” threshold.104 
Similarly, in 1994, Walter Dellinger, then the Assistant 
Attorney General for OLC, authored an opinion on behalf of his 
office arguing that American military activities in Haiti did not 
constitute war in the constitutional sense.105  Thus, even for 
proponents of the restrictive view, there was no constitutional 
violation.  This was because of the limited nature of the 
military’s involvement, the low risk of escalation, and because 
the intervention was with the full approval of the Haitian 
government itself106 —something which of course was not true 
in the case of American intervention in Libya. 
The arguments put forth here essentially try to avoid the 
debate between the proponents of the restrictive and pro-
 
97.  See § 1543(a)(3); see also Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 3. 
98.  Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 4. 
99.  See id. 
100.  See id. at 4–5. 
101.  Id. at 5. 
102.  See id. at 6. 
103.  See id. at 7. 
104.  See Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 12. 
105.  See Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 173, 173 (1994). 
106.  See id. 
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executive positions.  Instead of quarreling about what the literal 
meaning of “declaring” war is and what this establishes with 
regard to the relative power of the executive and legislative 
branches, Krass, Koh, and Dellinger try to carve out a use of 
military force that is minimal enough so as not to rise to the level 
of “war,” or “hostilities,” resulting in the avoidance of 
constitutional and statutory questions about the correct 
understanding of the declare war clause and the meaning and 
constitutionality of the WPR.  Koh asserts that Congress has 
“largely acquiesced in this interpretation.”107  Though, as he also 
points out, the Clinton Administration essentially ignored this 
distinction when it came to the Kosovo bombing campaign and 
the sixty-day deadline,108 principally because officials came to 
the conclusion that, even though what was occurring at the 
sixty-day mark constituted hostilities, it would have been 
disastrous to stop at that point and wait for congressional 
assent.109 
While it is fair to characterize the position of Krass, 
Dellinger, and Koh as between the poles represented by the 
restrictive and pro-executive viewpoints, it is equally fair to note 
that it is a somewhat pro-executive position in its own right.  
This stance allows the executive branch to take the initiative in 
determining what level of military activity does and does not 
constitute “hostilities.”  Thus, the president will still have 
considerable power to commence military engagements without 
congressional sanction.  The pro-executive bent of this position 
should not be surprising given that the statements of the 
position have come from individuals who were acting in their 
capacities as executive branch attorneys.110 
 
 
107.  Koh, supra note 43, at 978. 
108.  See id. at 978–79. 
109.  See id. at 979. 
110.  Though beyond the scope of this article, the question of whether the 
primary obligation of lawyers in OLC or elsewhere in the Executive Branch 
should be to what they truly believe the state of the law is, or whether they 
should act as advocates for their client (especially when that client is the 
President), even if it means promoting a less convincing position, is an 
important one.  See, e.g., Robert Bauer, The National Security Lawyer, in 
Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 175 (2018). 
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Humanitarian Intervention 
 
When the United Nations was created, its primary (if not 
only) purpose was to prevent, or at least reduce, armed conflict 
between its member states.  The preamble to the U.N. Charter 
states that one of the organization’s goals would be “to maintain 
international peace and security.”111  In the new international 
body’s view, the main way to attain this goal would be to 
eliminate armed interstate conflict.  Thus, Article 2(4) of the 
Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”112  Additionally, Article 2(3) directs member states to 
“settle their international disputes by peaceful means.”113 
It should not be surprising that the U.N. started with such 
a strong focus on interstate armed conflict.  It was, of course, 
founded in the ashes of the most destructive war the world had 
ever seen and not long after the end of the second most lethal.  
As if to leave no doubt, the Charter’s preamble references the 
two world wars right from the start.114  The choice of solution to 
prevent a repeat of these two catastrophes was a focus on the 
sovereignty of nation states.  It was thought that if such 
sovereignty were to be protected, then it would greatly reduce, 
perhaps even eliminate, large-scale armed conflict.  As Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar writes: 
 
Directly after the war, Americans and their allies 
emphasized the importance of creating a collective 
security arrangement to promote international 
security by protecting sovereign nations against 
aggressive war.  I call this approach ‘sovereignty-
centered collective security.’ Its overt, organizing 
principle was a deep reverence for an expansive 
concept of national territorial sovereignty.115 
 
111.  U.N. Charter pmbl. 
112.  Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, ¶ 4. 
113.  Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, ¶ 3. 
114.  See id. at pmbl. 
115. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Reflections on Sovereignty and 
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This focus on the sovereignty of nation-states was hardly a 
radical choice in 1945.  David Scheffer observes that: 
 
Sovereignty is the central pillar of international 
law. The very purpose of the law of nations, as 
international law was formerly described, was to 
create legal safeguards for the preservation of the 
sovereign power vested in the governments of 
distinct territorial units called nation-states. For 
centuries, sovereignty identified the nation-state 
as the legitimate international actor entitled to 
the protection of international law.116 
 
This is a concept that dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648.117  Though this is not to say that there had been no 
attempts in international lawmaking to protect individuals as 
individuals and not just as members of nation states.  Multiple 
Geneva and Hague Conventions, all passed before the creation 
of the U.N., addressed the rights of individuals, especially in 
times of armed conflict.118 
The flip side of the emphasis on the inviolability of 
international boundaries was a commitment from the U.N. to 
stay out of the internal affairs of its member states.  Thus, 
Article 2(7) of the Charter states that “[n]othing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
 
Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 211, 215 (2004). 
116.  David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.  253, 259–60 (1992).  
117.  See, e.g., RICHARD HAASS, A WORLD IN DISARRAY: AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 22–24 (2017); T. Modibo Ocran, The 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (explaining “[i]n modern history, the 
principle of sovereignty was established under the Treaty of Westphalia of 
1648, which brought an end to the Thirty-Year War”).  
118.  See generally Amanda Alexander, A Short History of International 
Humanitarian Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 109 (2015) (discussing conventions); see 
also Karina Michael Waller, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of 
International Law: How the Rise of Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts Has Rendered 
International Human Rights Laws Ineffective, Especially Regarding Sex-Based 
Crimes, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 621, 624–25 (2001) (discussing 
Geneva and Hague conventions). 
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of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters 
to settlement under the present Charter.”119 As Ocran writes, 
“[t]he principle of noninterference in the affairs of another state 
is viewed as a corollary of the more basic principle of 
sovereignty.”120 
The hands-off approach to domestic issues does have a 
limitation: it does not preclude “the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.”121 However, an examination of 
Chapter VII shows that it is concerned with taking action 
against states which violate the sovereignty of other states, not 
against states that violate the rights of their own people.  Most 
importantly, Article 51’s self-defense provision applies in 
situations in which a member-state has suffered an armed 
attack.122  There is no discussion of the right of self-defense by, 
for example, a minority group in a member-state that is being 
attacked by its own government, much less the right of another 
member-state to intervene on behalf of that minority group.  So, 
while the Security Council invoked Chapter VII on behalf of 
South Korea, the use of armed force against North Korea was 
triggered by its invasion of the South, not because of any 
violation of the rights of North Koreans.  The first Security 
Council Resolution on the Korean conflict, Number 82, began by 
noting that the Republic of Korea was a “lawfully established 
government.”123  All North Korea was expected to do was retreat 
to the 38th Parallel;124 there wasn’t any discussion concerning the 
North Korean government’s treatment of its nationals. 
However, in the years since 1945, support for humanitarian 
intervention, the idea that there is a need in some circumstances 
to intercede in the internal affairs of states to prevent or end 
human rights catastrophes, has gathered steam—Article 2(7) 
notwithstanding.125  While there may not be one universally 
 
119.  U.N. Charter ch. 1, art. 2, ¶ 7. 
120.  Ocran, supra note 117, at 3. 
121.  Id. (quoting Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human 
Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 205, 208–09 (1969)). 
122.  See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
123.  S.C. Res. 82, pmbl. (June 25, 1950).  
124.  See id. at ¶ 1. 
125. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under 
International Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging 
New Norm “Responsibility to Protect” Make a Difference?, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L & 
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accepted definition of the term, it has been characterized as “the 
justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the 
inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and 
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the 
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.”126 
Similarly, Scheffer affirms that: 
 
The classical definition of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ is limited to those instances in which 
a nation unilaterally uses military force to 
intervene in the territory of another state for the 
purpose of protecting a sizable group of 
indigenous people from life-threatening or 
otherwise unconscionable infractions of their 
human rights that the national government 
inflicts or in which it acquiesces.127 
 
However defined, as Harold Koh points out, the concept can 
be found as far back as in the writings of seventeenth-century 
international law scholar Hugo Grotius.128  In Volume 2 of De 
Jure Ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace), Grotius considers 
“[w]hether we have a just Cause for War with another Prince, in 
order to relieve his Subjects from their Oppression under 
him.”129  While he acknowledges that “since the Institution of 
Civil Societies, the Governors of every State have acquired some 
peculiar Right over their . . . Subjects,”130 he concludes that “if 
the Injustice be visible, as if a Busiris, a Phalaris, or a Thracian 
Diomedes exercise such Tyrannies over Subjects, as no good Man 
living can approve of, the Right of human Society shall not be 
 
POL’Y 353, 355 (2007) (stating”[t]he international human rights movement is 
of relatively recent origin. However, in a short time it has blossomed into a 
developed body of international human rights law, with the establishment of 
necessary institutions for its implementation and enforcement”). 
126.  ELLERY STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 352 
(1931); see also Ocran, supra note 117, at 8. 
127.  Scheffer, supra note 116, at 264. 
128.  See Koh, supra note 43, at 976 n.10. 
129.  2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1159 (Richard Tuck 
ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2005). 
130.  Id. 
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therefore excluded.”131 
Michael Reisman argues that one of the first seeds of 
contemporary support for humanitarian intervention was pro-
democracy language in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”).132  The UDHR was written shortly after the 
U.N. Charter and, therefore, at a time when state sovereignty 
was still the rule.133  However, it included language establishing 
popular will expressed through regular, free elections as the 
basis for governmental legitimacy.134  As Reisman notes, because 
it has become feasible to measure a state’s commitment to free 
elections, it is now possible to call to account states that fail to 
meet this standard, even at the cost of impinging on their 
sovereignty.135  It also means that already-existing states have 
the means to deny recognition to a group that seizes power 
through a coup or revolution, instead of by means of popular 
support.136  Thus, we have now reached the stage where Reisman 
can say that “no serious scholar still supports the contention that 
internal human rights are ‘essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state’ and hence insulated from international 
law.”137 
Apart from the issue of a particular government’s 
democratic legitimacy is the question whether an 
internationally-recognized government acts humanely toward 
its own people.  Furthermore, if its people are being treated 
poorly and the government is in serious violation of 
international human rights treaties, what corrective action, if 
any, may be taken in response? 
In her book, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of 
Genocide, Samantha Power details the efforts of Raphael 
 
131.  Id. at 1161. 
132. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 867–68 (1990). 
133.  See id. at 867. 
134.  See id. at 867–68.  
135.  See id. at 868. 
136.  See id. at 870.  
137.  Id. at 869; see also Koh, supra note 43, at 1004 (stating “I believe 
that international law has evolved sufficiently to permit morally legitimate 
action to prevent atrocities by responding, for example, to the deliberate use of 
chemical weapons”). 
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Lemkin, who barely escaped Poland ahead of the Nazi army138 
and lost dozens of family members to the Holocaust,139 to create 
and define the term genocide.140  As Power informs her readers, 
Lemkin was a critic of the Nuremberg trials because the Court 
only sought to punish crimes that occurred after the Nazis had 
crossed international borders, waging “aggressive war.”141  Thus, 
“[b]y inference, if the Nazis had exterminated the entire German 
Jewish population but never invaded Poland, they would not 
have been liable at Nuremberg.”142  Lemkin wanted something 
that would encompass actions taken by a government against its 
own nationals.143  Though at first he struggled to win support for 
his ideas,144 he was instrumental in the General Assembly’s 
1948 vote to establish the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.145  Because the 
Convention defined genocide as, inter alia, killing members of “a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group,”146 there was no 
requirement of interstate conflict to invoke the Convention’s 
prohibitions.  Thus, despite the traditional notions of 
sovereignty expressed in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. 
Charter, there were at least some indications from early in the 
U.N.’s history that sovereignty might not be completely 
inviolable. 
Still, humanitarian intervention has always been a 
troubling concept for many people, not only because of its 
challenge to traditional notions of state sovereignty, but also due 
to fears that making such actions acceptable would have 
significant pernicious effects and encourage states to pursue all 
sorts of goals while claiming to be intervening on humanitarian 
grounds.147  Edward Luttwak makes a slightly different 
 
138.  See SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL:” AMERICA AND THE 
AGE OF GENOCIDE 23–26 (2002). 
139.  See id. at 49. 
140.  See id. at 31–60. 
141.  Id. at 49. 
142.  Id. 
143.  See id. at 51. 
144.  See POWER, supra note 138, at 50. 
145.  See id. at 59–60.  
146.  G.A. Res. 260 art. II, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948). 
147.  See Scheffer, supra note 116, at 258 (noting that opponents of 
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argument, claiming that peacekeeping operations cause more 
long-term harm than good because it is better to let the 
belligerents wear themselves out.148 
Regardless, even if everyone were to agree on the 
acceptability of humanitarian intervention, it is one thing to 
pass a treaty banning genocide and quite another to get member-
states to actively put it into effect.  Power argues that, in order 
for the ban to have been effective, it required leadership from 
the United States.149  However, the U.S. did not even ratify the 
treaty until 1988, much less attempt to lead the world in 
enforcing its prohibitions.150 
Unfortunately, the second half of the twentieth century saw 
more than its share of mass killings, providing plenty of 
opportunities for the world to decide whether, and under what 
conditions, humanitarian intervention might be acceptable or 
even a necessity.  As Power highlights, very little was done to 
respond to mass killings in Cambodia and Rwanda, and not 
nearly enough in the former Yugoslavia.151  Even as this is being 
written, humanitarian disasters are occurring in Syria and 
Burma, among other places. 
Nevertheless, even if relatively little action has been taken 
in response to these events, their occurrences have increased 
discussion of and support for at least the concept of 
humanitarian intervention, despite the fact that such 
interventions would seem to violate Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the 
U.N. Charter.  In decrying the lack of response to various human 
rights crises, Ved Nanda lays the blame squarely on these 
provisions: “the underlying cause remains the current state-
centered international system, under which each state jealously 
guards its sovereignty and often invokes the doctrine of non-
 
humanitarian intervention argued that “to invoke a ‘principle’ of humanitarian 
intervention would open a Pandora’s Box of military interventions that would 
disrupt the nation-state system and permit the forcible pursuit of political, 
economic, and security objectives far removed from alleged humanitarian 
concerns”). 
148.  See Edward N. Luttwak, Give War a Chance, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 36, 
37–38 (1999); see also Ocran, supra note 117, at 3 (discussing Luttwak). 
149.  See POWER, supra note 138, at 61. 
150.  See id. at 161–69. 
151.  See generally id. at 87–155, 247–475. 
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intervention in its internal affairs.”152  Still, as he also observes, 
the situation is changing: 
 
The period since 1976 has witnessed great 
strides in the development of international 
human rights law as an impressive body of norms, 
institutions, and procedures has transformed the 
subject. Regional human rights machinery exists 
in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, and is in the 
formative stage in Southeast Asia, 
complementing the U.N. machinery created to 
promote and protect human rights and to provide 
effective remedies. Customary international law 
has also played a significant role in this process. 
It would have been inconceivable sixty years 
ago to envisage the development and progress of 
international human rights law we see today. To 
illustrate, numerous international agreements 
have created a wide range of international human 
rights norms, treaty bodies have been established 
to monitor implementation by member states of 
their treaty obligations, and an ever-growing body 
of soft law—emerging international human rights 
guidelines, principles, and norms—has developed. 
All these developments are of great significance 
for every student of international human rights 
law.153 
 
Similarly, Scheffer shines a light on a significant evolution 
in international attitudes during the latter half of the twentieth 
century, describing a “new standard of intolerance for human 
misery and human atrocities.”154  As a result, “[d]espite the 
emphatic character of [Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter], its 
terminology has been interpreted and qualified.”155  Scheffer 
quotes a 1991 speech by then U.N. Secretary-General Javier 
 
152.  Nanda, supra note 125, at 354. 
153.  Id. at 356. 
154.  Scheffer, supra note 116, at 259. 
155.  Id. at 261. 
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Perez de Cuellar in which the Secretary-General, while not 
willing to endorse any sort of open-ended principle of 
humanitarian intervention, did say that “[i]t is now increasingly 
felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential 
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective 
barrier behind which human rights could be massively or 
systematically violated with impunity.”156 
When looking for concrete examples of this change in 
attitude translating into action, the NATO intervention in the 
former Yugoslavia seems to have marked an important moment 
in the willingness of U.N. member-states to engage in military 
action in the name of humanitarian interests—Articles 2(4) and 
2(7) of the Charter notwithstanding.157  The intervenors had to 
claim humanitarian justifications in order to defend their 
“restrictive” view of the notion of state sovereignty.158  As Rohini 
Sen points out, the trend toward taking action on humanitarian 
grounds has increased post-Yugoslavia.159 
Contributing to this trend is the rise in importance of NGOs 
and civil society groups.  Not only is state sovereignty no longer 
inviolable, but states are no longer the only significant actors on 
the world stage.  While NGOs played advisory roles in the U.N.’s 
founding, such groups were initially given no formal role in the 
organization’s governing structure.160  Additionally, while NGOs 
and other groups still lack the formal authority and position of 
 
156.  Id. at 262 (internal citation omitted).  
157. See Rohini Sen, Use of Force and the ‘Humanitarian’ Face of 
Intervention in the 21st Century, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 457, 459 (2014) (writing that 
NATO’s actions “invigorated the notion of unilateralism” and that “[f]or the 
first time since the establishment of the United Nations’ collective security 
system, a group of states expressly defended a breach of state sovereignty 
through unilateral use of force, predominantly on humanitarian grounds”).  
158.  See id. at 460.  
159. See id.; see also Koh, supra note 43, at 1007. (“Since Kosovo . . . 
within the international legal order, the multilateral use of force for 
humanitarian ends is perceived as far more legitimate than it was only a few 
decades ago” (internal citation omitted)).  As Sen also discusses, the Pandora’s 
Box fears that Scheffer brings up in his article  have also materialized: Russia 
has justified its annexation of Crimea on humanitarian grounds, claiming 
human rights violations against ethnic Russians in the area.  See supra note 
148 and accompanying text; see also Sen, supra note 157, at 461; see infra notes 
189–94 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
160. See David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 595, 609 (2010). 
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sovereign states, “[t]he emergence of twenty-first century 
institutions that are adopting multi-stakeholder models of 
governance and expanding the role of civil society creates an 
opening for new ways of thinking about the governance of 
international institutions.”161  As a result, “[c]ivil society groups 
are among a range of non-state actors that are now centrally 
involved in the formal governance of diverse institutions and are 
transforming the nature of the debate around many key global 
challenges.”162  These institutions provide yet another source of 
authority beyond the nation-state. 
 
The Responsibility to Protect 
 
A more recent development in humanitarian-intervention 
thinking comes in the form of the so-called “Responsibility to 
Protect,” or R2P. Whereas humanitarian intervention, as first 
understood, was thought to give countries a means to intervene 
in the internal affairs of fellow sovereign states, R2P takes this 
a step further, putting forth the notion that countries may in fact 
have an affirmative obligation or responsibility to intervene in 
the face of human rights crises outside their own borders. 
R2P was first formalized and explained in a 2001 report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (“ICISS”), which was created by the Canadian 
government. The ICISS document defined the issue as follows: 
“the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take 
coercive – and in particular military – action, against another 
state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other 
state.”163 A report from the 2005 World Summit led to a General 
Assembly resolution stating that: 
 
[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a 
timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and 
 
161.  Id. at 615. 
162.  Id. 
163. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT vii (2001).  
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in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.164 
 
As Richard Haass explains, “what made R2P even more 
significant was an associated notion, namely that the 
‘international community’ also had the responsibility to help to 
protect populations . . . including through the use of military 
force . . . even if [the affected sovereign] opposed outside 
involvement.”165 
R2P remains a controversial idea.  Milena Sterio writes that 
R2P “has experienced several important advancements,”166 
including being specifically referenced in at least two Security 
Council Resolutions.167  However, she also observes that it has 
 
164.  G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139 (Oct. 24, 2005) (stating that this resolution 
leaves the ultimate decision in the hands of the Security Council, which some 
advocates of greater intervention fear will too often stymie needed action.  
Because of this, some R2P proposals have extended to an imposition on a 
different, though related, form of sovereignty: proposals to restrict the veto 
powers of the 5 permanent members (“P5”) of the Security Council, in 
situations deemed humanitarian crises by the Secretary-General); see also 
Harvard Law Review, Recent Draft Resolution: International Law—The 
Responsibility to Protect—Draft Security Council Resolution Referring Syrian 
Conflict to the International Criminal Court Vetoed by Russia and China (13 
in Favor, 2 Against).—U.N. Scor, 69th Sess., 7180th Mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (2015) (describing the 
concept known as the Responsibility Not to Veto, or RN2V). 
165.  HAASS, supra note 117, at 116; see also Nadia Banteka, Dangerous 
Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Reform of the U.N. Security 
Council, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 388 n.18 (2016) (stating “[h]istorically, 
R2P had been invented to replace the highly controversial concept of 
humanitarian intervention by shifting the terms of the debate from 
sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility and from a right to 
intervene to a responsibility to protect”). 
166.  Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: Legitimate 
and Legal?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 109, 132 (2014). 
167.  See S.C. Res. 1674 ¶ 4 (“[r]eaffirm[ing] the provisions of paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity”); see also S.C. Res. 1706 pmbl. 
(referencing Resolution 1674 as well as the relevant portions of the World 
Summit document on R2P); see Sterio, supra note 166, at 132. 
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not reached the level of general acceptance necessary for it to be 
considered binding, customary law.168  Furthermore, the 
General Assembly refused to allocate funds for a newly formed 
office on R2P,169 and “member states have not progressed further 
than agreeing to continue ‘considering’ this concept.”170  Neomi 
Rao argues that “[p]roponents of R2P have failed to identify the 
particular duty that State R owes to People V and to provide an 
adequate foundation for it.”171  She makes the additional claim 
that, wholly apart from the imposition on the sovereignty of the 
state that is victimizing its nationals, casting intervention as an 
obligation on the part of the potentially intervening state 
interferes with that state’s right to choose not to intervene.172 
These practical and theoretical criticisms of R2P are hardly 
trivial.  That said, it remains the case that in little longer than 
a half century since World War II, the international community 
has shown signs of shifting from the idea of sovereignty being all 
but inviolable to the notion that countries might have the 
authority to violate the sovereignty of other countries in the 
name of humanitarian concerns, to the idea that these countries 
not only have the option to intervene, but might well be obligated 
to do so—no small amount of movement in a relatively short 
period of time. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention and Theories of Presidential 
Warmaking Authority 
 
Having looked at some of the main theories on what the 
Constitution says about the President’s authority to engage in 
military action without first seeking congressional approval, we 
can now consider those theories as they apply to humanitarian 
intervention, whether in its more traditional version or under 
the rubric of R2P. 
 
168.  See Sterio, supra note 166, at 133. 
169.  See id. 
170.  Id. at 135; see also Neomi Rao, The Choice to Protect: Rethinking 
Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
697, 703 (2013) (stating “[t]he real-world adoption of R2P by states, however, 
has been more modest”). 
171.  Rao, supra note 170, at 726. 
172.  See id. at 733–34. 
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An initial problem is the difficulty in arguing that the 
Founders anticipated the concept of humanitarian intervention, 
much less how it should be evaluated under the Constitution. 
There is nothing to suggest that the attendees at the 1787 
Constitutional Convention envisioned a time when the United 
States would be a, much less the, dominant world power with 
the capacity (and standing army) to intervene at times and 
places of its choosing, and in circumstances that did not involve 
serious threats to America’s national security.  Even if we accept 
that the Founders wanted to limit military “adventurism” by the 
Commander in Chief, it is not clear that humanitarian 
intervention qualifies as the sort of adventurism the Founders 
feared. 
Are humanitarian interventions different than other 
military actions for purposes of the president’s constitutional 
authority?  One implication of the position taken by the 
expansive, pro-executive camp appears to be that, if the 
Constitution intends to entrust the president with at least the 
initial decision to take America into some form of armed conflict, 
then it should not matter whether it is to (a) fend off an 
immediate attack; (b) engage in a longer term conflict to protect 
vital national security interests; or (c) stave off a humanitarian 
disaster. 
On the other hand, part of the argument for giving the 
president sole authority to make this decision (at least initially) 
is because he is in a uniquely strong and well-informed position 
to quickly assess the national interest and respond 
appropriately.  This may not be the case with regard to 
humanitarian intervention, where the United States is less 
likely to be under any immediate threat and where there will 
generally be more time for fuller consideration of what America’s 
options are before a decision is made.  The genocides in 
Cambodia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, for example, did 
not happen overnight.  While any delays in responding risked 
additional lives lost, these were not situations where a choice to 
intervene had to be taken at a particular moment, if it was to be 
made at all.  Thus, the sorts of explanations given to defend a 
pro-executive version of war powers may not apply when it 
comes     to     humanitarian     intervention.      The     president’s 
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informational and efficiency advantages are probably not as 
important. 
Similarly, even if one accepts the R2P notion that countries, 
under some circumstances, do not have the choice, but rather an 
obligation, to intervene, this does little to change the picture.  
The facts that indicate a major humanitarian disaster is 
occurring are likely to be available to Congress as well as the 
president.  Once again, the president’s informational advantage 
will not be substantial, not to mention a decision will probably 
not need to be made overnight.  Plus, until such time as R2P 
gains significant authority in international law, there appears 
to be little suggestion that there is anything that would 
translate R2P into an affirmative, constitutional obligation of 
the president to initiate humanitarian interventions. 
The discussion of the presidential desire for fame provides 
useful insight into the question of presidential war power in the 
context of humanitarian intervention.  Irrespective of what the 
Founders’ intent was with regard to this authority, much less 
how this might apply in the context of humanitarian 
interventions, if we are concerned about an overly aggressive 
executive seeking out lasting fame, then we have less to worry 
about when it comes to humanitarian intervention.  This is 
partly true because public support for these types of actions 
tends to be somewhat weak to begin with and will likely 
disintegrate at signs of significant costs to the United States. 
Public opinion will have an impact on presidential authority 
in any kind of military conflict, especially if things go poorly, but 
presidents may be on an especially tight leash when it comes to 
humanitarian intervention.  In a 1996 article, Carolyn Logan 
discusses changes in public approval of American intervention 
in Somalia in the early 1990s.173  As Logan points out, when the 
intervention was initiated in December of 1992 by the (lame 
duck) Bush administration, there was an extremely high level of 
public backing.174  However, by October of the following year, 
especially after the deaths of eighteen American servicemen in 
Mogadishu, public support had fallen, leading to the withdrawal 
 
173.  See Carolyn J. Logan, U.S. Public Opinion and the Intervention in 
Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Interventions, 20 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 155 (1996).  
174.  See id. at 156. 
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of U.S. forces under public pressure.175 
One consequence of the seeming failure of the Somalia 
mission was the issuance in 1994 by the Clinton Administration 
of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (“PDD 25”).  This document 
set out standards for American involvement in what it described 
as “peace operations.”176  According to the Directive: 
 
[T]he United States will vote in the UN Security 
Council for multilateral peace operations, or, 
where appropriate, take the lead in calling for 
them, when member states are prepared to 
support the effort with forces and funds; when 
the U.S. decides that the operation’s political and 
military objectives are clear and feasible; and 
when UN involvement represents the best means 
to advance U.S. interests.177 
 
An annex to PDD 25 expands a bit on the factors to be 
considered in determining whether the U.S. would support a 
vote in favor of a “multilateral peace operation.”178  In addition 
to deciding whether involvement would advance American 
interests, the U.S. would consider whether: 
 
There is a threat to or breach of international 
peace and security, often of a regional character, 
defined as one or a combination of the following: 
− international aggression; 
− a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent 
action, coupled with violence; 
− sudden and unexpected interruption of [an] 
established democracy or gross violation of 




175.  Id. at 155–56. 
176.  Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (1994). 
177.  Id. at 2. 
178.  Id. 
179.  See id. at 17. 
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Logan asserts that PDD 25 had “provide[d] guidelines that 
virtually preclude American involvement in most types of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.”180  Naval Officer 
Glenn Ware writes that “[w]hat PDD 25 has done is 
unmistakable. Support or participation will not be forthcoming 
from the United States if the peace operation does not advance 
vital U.S. interests.”181  The “vital national interests” standard 
places a much higher bar than a “just causes” test, which would 
seem to allow for American intervention even where significant 
national interests could not be articulated.182  The impact of this 
change could be seen almost immediately in the American 
decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide.183  The 
impact of public opinion here, as well as a long-term trend of 
reduced public support in the U.S. for intervening in 
humanitarian crises,184 suggest that American presidents are 
constrained, even apart from whether they have the 
constitutional power to unilaterally authorize humanitarian 
intervention. 
Thus, if public opinion is liable to be cool toward 
humanitarian intervention, presidents are less likely to engage 
in such operations as a means of enhancing their own historical 
legacies.  Certainly, neither Presidents Bush nor Clinton added 
to their fame or historical legacies by means of the Somalia 
intervention.  As a result, there is less reason to fear a pro-
 
180.  See Logan, supra note 173, at 155 (stating that it is now known that 
PDD-25 was in the works before the Black Hawk Down incident, so the Clinton 
administration was likely moving toward a more restrictive policy on 
peacemaking even before the loss of the 18 soldiers); see also Flavia Gasbarri, 
PDD-25 and the Genocide in Rwanda: Why Not a Task for the United States?, 
WILSON CTR. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/pdd-25-
and-the-genocide-rwanda-why-not-task-for-the-united-states. Whether the 
final document would have been different in the absence of this disaster is, of 
course, impossible to know for sure. 
181.  Glenn T. Ware, The Emerging Norm of Humanitarian Intervention 
and Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 33 (1997). 
182.  See id. at 2–3. 
183.  Id.; see also POWER, supra note 138, at 377–80.  Though as Power 
also points out, President Clinton came to regret not intervening in Rwanda.  
See id. at 386. 
184.  See Max Fisher, American Isolationism Just Hit a 50-Year High. 
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executive analysis when it comes to humanitarian interventions, 
especially if they are short and limited to purely humanitarian 
objectives.  Power writes that “[n]o U.S. president has ever made 
genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever 
suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence.”185  The 
incentives to be overactive on humanitarian grounds (or 
allegedly humanitarian grounds) appear to be rather small or 
even non-existent.  If America has a president who is willing to 
misuse the military in the service of personal fame and glory, it 
is doubtful that he will see humanitarian interventions as a way 
to accomplish this goal. 
Any statutory limits on presidential war power that actually 
have been imposed by the WPR do not appear to have been 
created with humanitarian interventions in mind.  Koh makes 
this argument explicitly, both in an article and in his Senate 
testimony.  In the former, he writes that “it seemed clear that 
the focus of the War Powers Resolution was as a ‘No More 
Vietnams’ statute, not a ‘Let’s Have More Rwandas’ statute.”186  
In his Senate testimony, he asserted that “[w]e should not read 
into the 1973 Congress’s adoption of what many have called a 
‘No More Vietnams’ resolution an intent to require the 
premature termination, nearly forty years later, of limited 
military force in support of an international coalition to prevent 
the resumption of atrocities in Libya.”187  Thus, even to the 
extent that Congress has shown interest in dialing back 
executive power in this area, it was probably not with the desire 
to restrict presidential attempts to stop serious, large scale 
human rights violations. 
 
Reasons for Caution 
 
This is not to say that there is nothing to fear from greater 
presidential autonomy when it comes to making the decision to 
intercede for humanitarian purposes; even seemingly legitimate 
authority can be abused.  While intervening in Rwanda, for 
example, would have clearly been a valid humanitarian attempt 
 
185.  POWER, supra note 138, at xxi. 
186.  See Koh, supra note 43, at 991. 
187.  Koh Statement, supra note 43, at 12. 
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to stop mass slaughter, not all claims may be similarly justified. 
Russia’s recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine were both 
defended on the desire to protect Russian nationals living in 
those two countries,188 a claim that was viewed rather 
skeptically throughout much of the world.189  The result is that, 
as one commentator has put it: 
 
While the legal concept of humanitarian 
intervention may allow for a solution to an 
immediate crisis, such as that in Syria, it may also 
allow for an opportunist state, such as Russia, to 
exploit the amorphous nature of morality to 
justify an intervention into a coveted territory, 
such as the Ukraine, for geographic or political 
purposes.190 
 
In fact, protecting one’s nationals abroad has been viewed 
under some circumstances as a category of humanitarian 
intervention.191  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
 
188.  See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, International Human Rights Law: An 
Unexpected Threat to Peace, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 803, 811 (2018). 
189.  See, e.g., Adam Twardowski, Note, The Return of Novorossiya: Why 
Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine Exposes the Weakness of International Law, 
24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 351, 364 (2015) (noting that the Ukrainian Association of 
International Law pointed out that “no duly authorized national, foreign or 
international institution has declared any violation of human rights on the 
territory of Ukraine, or specifically in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
which would have required the intervention of any subject of international law 
or the international community” (internal citation omitted)). With regard to 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia, see Robert P. Chatham, Defense of Nationals 
Abroad: The Legitimacy of Russia’s Invasion of Georgia, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 75, 
100–01 (2011) (stating “the imminence of the danger Russian nationals faced 
is debatable at best. More significantly, the Russian citizens were very likely 
voluntarily residing in South Ossetia and free to leave at any time as they had 
Russian passports and lived in territory bordering Russia.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
190.  Shane Reeves, To Russia With Love: How Moral Arguments for a 
Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Opened the Door for an Invasion of the 
Ukraine, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 199, 212–13 (2014) (internal citations 
omitted). 
191.  See, e.g., Chatham, supra note 189, at 91 (stating “[s]ome consider 
humanitarian intervention to encompass defense of a state’s nationals abroad” 
(internal citation omitted)).  American intervention in Grenada in 1983 was 
justified on the basis of a threat to American nationals.  See, e.g., John Norton 
Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 145, 
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specifically referenced R2P in standing up for his country’s 
engagements in Georgia192 and made similar-sounding 
statements in justifying the invasion of Ukraine.193  While 
Russia’s government may be less constrained by popular opinion 
than America’s, this does not eliminate the possibility that 
power may be abused by an American president who has less-
than-pure humanitarian motivations for acting.  It is worth 
noting that the one recent humanitarian intervention by the 
United States that most clearly crossed the line into “hostilities” 
that would trigger the WPR framework—Bosnia194—was said to 
be motivated at least in part by President Clinton’s desire to 
“look forceful”195 and concern with “his place in history.”196 
Another factor that may lead to intervention, even when not 
fully justified, is the greater ease with which some forms of 
military action may be undertaken.  While technological 
developments which result in a reduced threat to the lives of 
American forces is a positive development, it may make it, in 
effect, too easy to intervene.  As Rebecca Crootof explains: 
 
Drones, cyber operations, and other technological 
advances in weaponry already allow the United 
States to intervene militarily with minimal boots 
on the ground, and increased autonomy in weapon 
systems will further reduce risk to soldiers. As 
human troops are augmented and supplanted by 
robotic ones, one of the remaining incentives for 
Congress to check presidential warmongering—
popular outrage at the loss of American lives—
will diminish. By making it politically easier to 
justify the use of military force, autonomous 
weapon systems will contribute to the growing 
concentration of the war power in the hands of the 




192.  See Twardowski, supra note 189, at 364 (internal citation omitted). 
193.  See id. at 363 (internal citation omitted). 
194.  See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
195.  See Treanor, supra note 18, at 771 n.440 (internal citation omitted). 
196.  See id. at 766 (internal citation omitted). 
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international doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.197 
 
When combined with the arguments for presidential 
flexibility to initiate military activity that does not rise to the 
level of “hostilities,” this has the potential to allow for 
presidential freedom to engage in fairly serious military action 
relatively free of oversight.198 
This is an issue with implications that go far beyond the 
impact on presidential war powers.  Crootof mentions that there 
have been calls for an international ban on autonomous weapons 
precisely because they make war “too easy,”199 or, failing that, at 
least regulation of their use.200  In particular, for liberal 
democracies such as the United States, one of the limiting 
factors in going to war is the potential political unpopularity of 
a costly war.  If this constraint is removed, then more peaceful 
countries may generally feel less restrained in resorting to 
force.201  As Dawn Johnsen observes, while the intervening 
country may be glad to know that its own nationals are exposed 
to less risk, this does not mean that concern should not be given 
to casualties at the site of intervention: 
 
In a situation in which the United States has the 
capacity to devastate populations in another 
country through air strikes without risk to 
American lives, that potential loss of life must be 
a relevant factor in determining whether the 
intervention constitutes either “war” in the 
constitutional sense or “hostilities” for purposes of 
 
197.  Rebecca Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer Robots, 40 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 909, 910–11 (2015). 
198.  See Bejesky, supra note 16, at 5–6 (quoting argument made by 
former Bush adviser Jack Goldsmith that the claims made by the Obama 
Administration in relation to its Libya intervention would mean that “the 
[P]resident can wage war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles 
without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution’s time limits” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
199.  See Crootof, supra note 197, at 919–20. 
200.  See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1894–1903 (2015). 
201.  See Crootof, supra note 197, at 925. 
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the War Powers Resolution (or both). Not to 
consider foreign casualties inflicted by U.S. forces 
would seem especially perverse in the context of 
humanitarian interventions.202 
 
Crootof concludes with regard to America specifically, that 
while the existence of autonomous weapons will not greatly 
increase a president’s ability to involve the United States in 
what are likely to be major, long-term military conflicts, a 
president may well feel that he has a freer hand when it comes 
to short-term actions,203 a category that likely includes 
interventions that are defended as being humanitarian in 
nature.204  Thus, future occupants of the White House could be 
increasingly tempted to intervene, even if a truly legitimate 
basis for doing so is lacking, because it is both quick and easy to 
do so, thereby removing previously existing checks on 
presidential action.  If we give presidents an additional basis for 
military conflict, such as humanitarian intervention, and reduce 
the costs for such action, there is certainly the potential for 
abuse of authority.  Furthermore, Johnsen argues that 
precedents that are generated in cases of humanitarian 
intervention risk being applied in other contexts: “if we 
recognize a humanitarian exception to the War Powers 
Resolution, why not also a counterterrorism exception?  Why not 
a similar exception for military ‘first strikes’ to degrade nuclear 
and other capabilities of nations controlled by extraordinarily 
dangerous hands?”205 
One response to this is to create explicit criteria for when 
humanitarian intervention is justified.  Such guidelines would 
provide both a basis upon which to judge a state’s action and at 
least some constraint to an executive before he decides to 
intervene.  The standards set out in PDD 25 discussed above206 
establish a high bar for American support of humanitarian 
 
202.  Dawn Johnsen, When Responsibilities Collide: Humanitarian 
Intervention, Shared War Powers, and the Rule of Law, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1065, 
1096 (2016) (internal citations omitted). 
203.  See Crootof, supra note 197, at 926–27.  
204.  See id. at 929–30.  
205.  Johnsen, supra note 202, at 1078. 
206.  See supra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
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efforts.  Koh supports some role for humanitarian intervention, 
criticizing an “absolutist” conception of state sovereignty that 
“tolerates gross atrocities.”207  However, Koh argues that a 
failure to articulate a clear standard for when the default rule of 
protecting state sovereignty must give way to a need to end 
human rights abuses will cause mischief of its own.208  In 
particular, he faults the Clinton Administration for failing to set 
forth a standard that explained its decision to intervene in 
Kosovo,209 a somewhat ironic criticism given the arguments that 
the post-Somalia PDD 25 standards were alleged to be too hard 
to meet—and perhaps they were. 
There have been a number of attempts to develop 
specifications for when humanitarian intervention is justified.  
For example, in a 2014 letter, British officials set forth the 
following considerations for interventions, even in the absence 
of a Security Council resolution: 
 
(i)  there is convincing evidence, generally 
accepted by the international community as 
a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress 
on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief; 
(ii)  it must be objectively clear that there is no 
practicable alternative to the use of force if 
lives are to be saved; and 
(iii)  the proposed use of force must be necessary 
and proportionate to the aim of relief of 
humanitarian need and must be strictly 
limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the 
minimum necessary to achieve that end and 
for no other purpose).210 
 
 
207.  See Koh, supra note 43, at 1014. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, U.K. Minister of 
State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to the Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Ottaway 
MP, U.K. House of Commons (Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with author); see also 
Ashley Deeks, Commentary, Multi-Part Tests in the Jus Ad Bellum, 53 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1035, 1058 (2016). 
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Koh has his own benchmarks.  In his view, in situations 
where a humanitarian crisis threatens consequences 
“significantly disruptive of international order,” which would 
soon lead to “imminent threats” to the state(s) considering 
intervening, and all other remedies have been exhausted or are 
unavailable, including a Security Council resolution due to a 
persistent veto by one of the P5, “limited force for genuinely 
humanitarian purposes that was necessary and proportionate to 
address the imminent threat [would be acceptable because it] 
would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and 
would terminate as soon as the threat is abated.”211  Koh goes on 
to say that any case for intervention would be strengthened to 
the extent that intervening states could demonstrate that they 
were acting collectively and that such action was necessary to 
prevent the use of per se illegal means, such as chemical 
weapons, or would help prevent a per se illegal end, such as 
genocide or other mass slaughter.212  Koh’s criteria appear to be 
narrower than the British version because they, in an echo of 
PDD 25, tie any attempt to intervene to a threat to the 
intervening country’s own national security. 
Both of these proposals are written with an eye toward 
defending a state’s action to the rest of the international 
community.  However, there is no reason that the principles they 
enunciate—that (1) action should only come after other 
alternatives have been exhausted, (2) action must be limited and 
proportional to prevent or bring to a close serious human rights 
abuses, and (3) it is better if intervention is undertaken by a 
group, rather than a single state acting alone—cannot be used 
as guideposts by a domestic audience judging the righteousness 
of a president’s choice to intervene. 
Koh argues that most legitimate humanitarian 
interventions are unlikely to rise to the level of “hostilities” for 
purposes of the WPR and, therefore, do not even implicate that 
law.213  However, even beyond that question, the guidelines 
suggested by Robertson and Koh provide standards by which to 
judge a presidential decision to engage in humanitarian 
intervention: How serious is the humanitarian risk?  Is there an 
 
211.  Koh, supra note 43, at 1011 (emphasis in original). 
212.  See id. 
213.  See id. at 1015–16.  
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impending threat to American interests if nothing is done?  Has 
the administration attempted to engage international 
institutions and/or close allies?  Do the actions appear to be 
proportionate and restrained in scope and duration?  If the 
president’s actions do not measure up, then Congress can make 
use of  its own authority, whether by refusing to fund the 
intervention or by using its investigative powers to attempt to 
discern if the president has less-than-humanitarian motives in 
play.  If the president knows ahead of time that his 
administration will be forced to answer for its actions, this 
should discourage adventurism dressed up as humanitarian 
intervention.  Thus, even a system that allows for presidential 
authority to initiate humanitarian intervention is not a blank 
check.  Finally, it is important to note that while working with a 
group of allies may be useful and increase the perceived 
legitimacy of any intervention, the United States is not just any 
country when it comes to commencing action.  Power asserts that 
American “leadership will be indispensable in encouraging U.S. 
allies” to engage in humanitarian interventions.214  If the 
president is constrained too much, then other countries may not 
pick up the slack, with consequences that will reverberate 




Interbranch fights related to military affairs have been with 
us since the beginning of the Republic.  Academic debates over 
the meaning of the declare war clause of the Constitution 
continue as well.  It is not clear how much these debates tell us 
about uses of force, not for military conquest or defense, but in 
the name of preventing or ending serious human rights abuses.  
Humanitarian interventions, in terms of their length and 
casualty levels, may be commensurate with the more limited 
 
214.  See POWER, supra note 138, at 513 (explaining that similarly, even 
though Professor Johnsen is wary of reading the WPR in a way to allow for 
Presidents to initiate humanitarian interventions without congressional 
assent, she writes that “[a]s a matter of policy, I embrace both the motivation 
behind the R2P movement and the United States’ special responsibilities to 
respond to humanitarian crises, including through interventions that involve 
the use of military force in ‘extreme and limited circumstances.’”); Johnsen, 
supra note 202, at 1069 (internal citation omitted). 
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uses of military force that presidents have engaged in 
throughout American history.  However, they do not resemble 
the sorts of defensive engagements or responses to emergency 
situations that even the proponents of the restrictive viewpoint 
would acknowledge as legitimate exercises of presidential 
power, irrespective of a grant of congressional authorization. 
It is proposed here that presidents be given at least some 
flexibility to initiate military action in the name of humanitarian 
intervention.  While any decision to use military force brings 
risks with it, using the military for humanitarian purposes 
presents less of a hazard to our constitutional order.  Such 
actions tend to be of short duration and, as a result, involve less 
threat to American life.  When it comes to the issue of 
presidential power, they do not provide the same “achieving 
glory” incentives with regard to public opinion that other forms 
of military action have typically presented to the president.  
Thus, there is less reason to fear that authority to engage in 
humanitarian intervention will be abused by the Commander in 
Chief.  Though, to the extent that this is a concern, we can look 
to the sorts of standards suggested by Koh and Robertson as 
means of judging the legitimacy of presidential action in this 
arena to limit the chance that presidents will abuse their power.  
In light of all of this, and in light of the terrible cost of inaction 
in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, we should be 
willing to live with some presidential freedom to use military 
force to respond to serious human rights abuses. 
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